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It is a sorry state of affairs when an American plaintiff is thrown out of an
American court because he does not establish a foreign law that is so nearly
unknowable, and that, if it is known, may provide a mere pittance calculated
according to barbarous concepts. One gathers that the reason why the authors
did not dwell on the injustices of Walton and Crosby is that they were concerned
in this book to deal with a "practical" subject in a "practical" way (p. 1). Is it
impractical, however, to suggest to American lawyers that our courts may return to the sensible and just course of applying the law of the forum when the
foreign law is not made to appear? If so, it can only be because the practical
sense of the American lawyer has been corrupted by the influence of an academic, imported, and highly conceptualistic theory of conflict of laws which is
quite inconsistent with the common law tradition.
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Race Relations and American Law. By Jack Greenberg. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1959. Pp. 481. $10.00.
Mr. Greenberg begins with the question: "Can the law alter race relations?"
and declares that his thesis is that "law often can change race relations, that
sometimes it has been indispensable to changing them, and that it has in fact
changed them, even spectacularly" (p. 2). He then provides rich documentation
and illustration for the oft made observations that laws do change, that these
changes are responsive to and creative of other changes in the "political, social,
economic, and moral" orders (p. 370), and that since 1938 there have been vast
changes in the legal institutions affecting race relations in the United States.
Mr. Greenberg has followed the general pattern established by M'yrdal, Rose,
and Sterner in An American Dilemma (1944). It is essentially a description of
how, since 1938, state law (in the broadest sense) in the United States has moved
away from substantial conformity to one of the major competing value-judgments about race relations in our society and into progressively closer conformity to the other, and a consideration of what additional legal arguments and
legislative and administrative actions might further reduce the gap between this
latter ideal and the norms applied by the agents of the state. In its narrowest
form, the progressively dominant value-judgment is that it is wrong to discriminate against any individual solely upon the basis of race. In its broadest
form, this value-premise states that it is wrong to differentiatebetween individuals solely upon the basis of race.
Again following An American Dilemma, Mr. Greenberg presents this narrowing gap in chapters three through ten as it affects each of several of the "main
categories of social activity" (p. 31): public accommodations and services (36
pages), interstate travel (18 pages), elections (19 pages), earning a living (54
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pages), education (67 pages), housing and real property (38 pages), criminal law
(30 pages), and domestic relations (12 pages). A final chapter in the body treats
the armed forces (16 pages) upon the ground that "integration of the armed
forces shows the potential of law for achieving changes in race relations."' The
book closes with several valuable appendices, including one which cites and describes briefly most of the existing legislation pertinent to the subject of race
relations.
The author presents his general "legal overview" in chapter two. It is Mr.
Greenberg's position that the narrow form of the previously described valuepremise is clearly embodied in the Constitution in the fifth and fourteenth
amendments as an express prohibition upon any such conduct by the "state,"
and with an implied obligation that the state take such action as necessary to
remedy any such discrimination as may exist. Furthermore, Mr. Greenberg appears to take the position throughout that, given what all Americans (including
the members of the Supreme Court) know about those state actions which have
for over one hundred years differentiated between individuals of various racial
ancestries, the broadest form of the premise is also included in the Constitution:
any state action which differentiatesbetween individuals solely upon the basis of
race is unconstitutional.He so holds it as a denial of equal protection and/or a
failure to meet the substantive reasonableness of classification necessary under
our due process requirements. Otherwise stated, his position is that any state
action which takes race into consideration or which seeks to give legal effect to
decisions based upon race (e.g., court enforcement of restrictive covenants) must
stand against an initial presumption of unconstitutionality. 3
It is not necessary for a reader to agree with Mr. Greenberg on these matters
in order to make profitable use of this book. However, it is necessary for the
reader to keep this position constantly in mind if he desires to understand the
author's evaluations of the constitutionality of statutes and practices currently
having legal effects. For instance, it is with this specific meaning of "unconstitutional" in mind that Mr. Greenberg states: "Antimiscegenation laws are
undoubtedly unconstitutional" (p. 353).
But this does not mean that the author expects all such laws to be so declared
by all courts tomorrow, or even the day after tomorrow. It means that he rejects
1"In a democracy no one is subject to greater legal control than those in the armed services,
and no other aspect of American life is so subject to government management, no other control
can be so swift and unequivocal" (p. 369).
2
As Professor Kurland has written in comment upon the School Segregation Cases: "The
second of the non-technical factors was the recognition by the Court that the separate but equal
doctrine has always resulted in separation but never in equality." Kurland, Book Review,
27 U. Car. L. REv. 170, 178 (1959).
'For closely related arguments, see Pollak, Racial Discriminationand Judicial Integrity:
A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. Rxv. 1 (1959); and Black, The Lawzidness of the
Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE IL.J. 421 (1960). Each of these articles goes some distance in
explicitly pointing out the "sociological nature" of Plessy v. Ferguson, but neither goes far
enough in this respect.
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the proposition that any state action is constitutional until and unless it is expressly rejected by the Supreme Court. Intervening between what is unconstitutional, in his usage, and what the courts so declare is the variable of judicial
restraint. As implied here, this idea of "judicial restraint" involves more than
such matters as standing to sue, the practice of accepting administrative determinations, hesitancy to enlarge jurisdiction, and deciding wherever possible on
some non-constitutional ground. Mr. Greenberg gives equally great weight to
such considerations as the scope of the immediate consequences of the statute in
question (whether the issue represents a "pressing interest"), the appropriateness of various kinds of legal change as an instrument of a particular social
4
change, and the ability of the courts to give reasonable effect to their decrees.
Thus, he anticipates that many courts in the foreseeable future will continue to
be "reluctant" to "strike down" antimiscegenation laws.
Our courts are assuredly "political bodies" in this sense, and it is almost a
truism that we all would reject the proposition that a matter is "political" and
beyond the hand of the judiciary merely because it is controversial.' Many of us
would be more likely to concur with Miss Mentschikoff that, of the two basic
types of disputes, the controversy which involves "a demand by some person or
sub-group for change in the standards regulating the future behavior in some
particular area of some or all the members of the group" is normally thought of
as one better suited to the "legislative process." 7 Yet one might suspect that
Mr. Greenberg would reply that the standard involved here, the fourteenth
amendment, was established not only by legislative process but also by that
tragic ultimate of political processes-a bloody Civil War. One can easily concur
with the remarks of Justice Holmes on the fourteenth amendment and social
experimentation' and yet conclude that after a century of experimentation the
4The author offers the opinion explicitly that "violence did not influence the results" of
any of the cases of school desegregation (p. 229).
If we examine the final conclusion of the most recent law review article which argues that
the existing miscegenation statutes perhaps do represent one area of social relations in which
the classification by race is justified, we are hard put to differentiate it from a plea that the
Supreme Court exercise considerable delay on this matter. "Thus, in the absence of any clear
basis to hold an anti-miscegenation law unconstitutional... it would be most improvident for
the Supreme Court to grant certiorari at this time. If certiorari be denied, there is no pronouncement to inflame passions on either side, and time may accomplish what no edict can." (Italics
supplied.) Williams, Racial Intermarriage-A ConstitutionalProblem, 11 W. REs. L. REv. 93,
101 (1959).
6 "If the Judiciary has the power to strike down what is plainly forbidden, what is there
about the matter of the judicial process, traditional separation of powers, or the doctrine of
judicial abstention from 'political' matters, that robs the Judiciary of its accustomed role of
inquiry and ascertainment of legislative purpose?" Judge Brown, dissenting, in Gomillion et al.
v. Lightfoot, 4 RAcE REL. L. REP. 993, 998 (1959).
7Mentschikoff, Some Observationson the Adjudicatory Process, 18-19 (1960) (unpublished
article).
8 "There is nothing that I more deprecate than the use of the Fourteenth Amendment beyond the absolute compulsion of its words to prevent the making of social experiments that an
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results are in: the various efforts among our states to give vitality to the fourteenth amendment within a framework of legally enforced racial segregation
seem to have failed. As predicted by Mr. Justice Harlan in his dissent in Plessy
v. Ferguson,0 these efforts appear only to have contributed to that very state of
affairs which on theirface they were to remedy."
So far as legal doctrines and further court-initiated changes are concerned,
the author sees this matter largely in terms of the question, "How inclusive can
the concept of 'state action' be made in considerationsinvolving race relations?"
(one-third of chapter two). He presents this as the dominant line of legal reasoning which must be followed with respect to "public" and "quasi-public" facilities, accommodations, and memberships. Writing early in 1959, he anticipated
that the next attempted sustained court actions along this line would be directed
toward hospitals, "private" housing, labor unions, and private colleges. He
states that the most forcible arguments of need and substantial state interest
could be presented on these matters. Against these criteria, he placed privately
owned ice cream parlors quite low on the list of priorities, although not so in the
case of restaurants which enjoy exclusive franchises along interstate highways.
The kinds of facilities now involved in the "sit-downs" (and so involved in
various parts of the United States for two decades) would presumably be somewhere in between these limits.
The author does not himself suggest how far or how fast the "state action"
concept will be extended by the courts. In fact, he seems to argue that this may
well depend in large part upon how far its extension is forced by sustained prosegregationists' demands for special privileges for whites only (as were denounced by Governor Collins in the case of the downtown lunch counters in
Florida) and by any continued lack of effective positive action by the coordinate
branches of government, federal, state, and local. "[T]here may be a race between
the spread of civil rights legislation and equalitarian treatment on the one hand,
and the expansion of the fourteenth amendment state action concept on the
other. Perhaps it is tautalogous to say that the courts will stop protecting minority rights when those rights no longer need protection. But the time of arrival of
that condition may help to decide for how long the state action idea will continue to grow" (pp. 60-61). In short, Mr. Greenberg seems to believe that most
important part of the community desires, in the insulated chambers afforded by the states,
even though the experiments may seem futile or noxious to me and to those whose judgment I
most respect." Dissent in Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1932).
9163 U.S. 537, 560 (1896).

10It seems to me that there is no other answer that can be given to Professor Wechsler's
apparently serious query: "Who will be bold enough to say whether the judgmentin the segregation cases will be judged fifty years from now to have advanced the cause of brotherhood or

to haveillustrated Bagehot's dictum that the 'courage which strengthens an enemy, and which
so loses, not only the present battle, but many after battles, is a heavy curse to men and nations.' "Reflections on the Conference,3 CoLum. LAW ALtmmi BumL., No. 2, p. 2 (1958), quoted
in Greenberg, p. 28. -
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American courts will not soon forget the dicta of justice McClellan of the
Supreme Court of Alabama, in justification of that state's segregation laws, that
those statutes were "enacted promotive of the social purpose of the dominant
race.""1
Although much of the book is occupied by discussions of the courts and court
cases, it is, in fact, to the legislative and executive branches that the author looks
for the most effective uses of law and other state action to reduce further the
gap between his ideal and reality. He anticipates a continuing spread of statutes
and ordinances, with special administrative agencies to implement them, toward the end of assuring further that Americans of minority races will have
equal opportunities to compete as individuals in the "main categories of social
activities."
It is, thus, the problem of state action positively aimed at integration, insofar
as it involves the uses of quotas and other related decisions based upon race,
which causes Mr. Greenberg the most unrest in view of his general position on
the fourteenth amendment. State action aimed at integration must comply
strictly with constitutional limitations. If the School Segregation Decisions12
sought to secure any general right it was the right to attend school in any community which desires or is required to have public schools in a school system
free of decisions based upon race. In the face of this, the use of state-applied
quotas in educational systems in the North would appear as a most improper
device for resolving the problems of residential segregation, as well as a poor
substitute for a more equitable resolution of this issue. The author is quite correct when he notes that the absence of quotas in public housing tends to turn
these projects into "Negro projects" because, at least in part, Negroes are overrepresented among those eligible. Here he notes that the issue is most clearly
seen when presented as a question of what happens when an individual is deprived of needed adequate housing because of the quota (and Mr. Greenberg is
correct on page 292 when he assumes that this individual will probably be a
Negro). The very heart of the author's moral and legal arguments lies in his
contention that the fourteenth amendment refers to "equality between individuals in spite of race" and not the fatuous "equality between the races" which
the Supreme Court was still willing to accept in Pace v. Alaband'3 and Plessy v.
Ferguson.14 Yet Mr. Greenberg's restless impatience merits at least as much
sympathy as Senator Eastland's need for time.
This total picture relates directly to another recurrent theme which runs
throughout the volume. On the one hand, the author repeatedly stresses that
under the American system of law-government, the extent to which anyone can
secure his lawful rights and convert his demands for equal opportunity into
11Story v. Alabama, 178 Ala. 98, 103, 59 So. 480,483 (1912).
2
1 Brown v. Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
13106 U.S. 583 (1883).
14163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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legal rights by means of judicial, legislative, and executive actions depends in
large measure upon the persistence and effectiveness of his demands, both as an
individual and as a member of organizations composed of others similarly situated or of like mind (p. 23).11 On the other hand, he stresses that the legal rights
secured through court action greatly enhance the abilities of the parties, individually and collectively, to utilize their political and extra-legal instruments in an
effective manner to secure further opportunities which, for technical or practical
reasons, can scarcely be secured solely by any amount of judicial action. There is
little doubt that Mr. Greenberg is seeking here in part to vindicate the largely
adjudicative program of the NAACP at a time when more spectacular leadeship has emerged upon the public scene by placing this program within a larger
perspective. However, this recurrent theme is also indicative of the extent to
which the various leadership levels in the quest for equal opportunities are increasingly informing the seekers that new opportunities are emerging and that
they as individuals must assume greater personal responsibilities both in the
efforts to expand the opportunities and in preparing themselves to take effective
advantage of existing opportunities.
Unfortunately, the weakest chapter of the book is the first, wherein the author addresses himself generally to the topic, "The Capacity of the Law to
Affect Race Relations." It is fine to reassert that prejudice has many different
causes (p. 27); to reassert that while one cannot outlaw prejudice one can by
means of law usually affect conduct and through this have some ameliorative
effect upon the prejudice of many persons in most situations; and to reassert
that some dimensions of a pattern of race relations are more readily altered than
others, while pointing out that the order does not necessarily follow that indicated by Myrdal in all situations (p. 13). His discussion comes much closer to
recent theoretical developments in sociology when it is couched in terms of the
"elasticity" of the "institution to be changed," but this is hardly pursued (p.
25). However, it is hardly reasonable to discuss the "inefficiency of the law"
when the term inefficiency as used refers only to slowness and the ability of one's
opposition (even if it be a judge in some instances) to use procedural devices to
increase delay (pp. 17-21). In short, Mr. Greenberg's general discussion of his
subject is completely devoid of any kind of organized conceptualization, and a
great deal of it seems to boil down to the proposition that it is more difficult to
induce a change in race relations by means of a change in law when the proposed
change in the social pattern is (a) opposed and (b) involves much physical re15If one grants that this general pattern constitutes one of the more important "ordinary
modes" by which our citizens in this world seek to protect their rights, then one must conclude
that the descendants of American slaves have finally reached that point which Justice Bradley
had in mind when he stated: "When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficient legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there must be some
stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the ranks of a mere citizen, and ceases to
be the special favorite of the laws, and when his rights, as a citizen or a man, are to be protected in the ordinary modes by which other men's rights are protected." Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
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arrangement than when the proposed change is (a) unopposed and (b) involves
little or no physical rearrangement. This is clearest in his discussion of the factors which "help to smooth a changeover in racial patterns" (p. 17), and his
attempt to state "in precisely what circumstances a particular situation in a
particular community is ready for legal efforts seeking racial change" (pp. 2930). His discussion of this last query may be correct, but a close analysis of it
leads me to conclude that his answer says something like "when the gap between
the status quo and the goal you are seeking is quite slight, when you are sure to
win, and when there is at least some and preferably substantial support among
the dominant group for the proposed change." With the school cases, this seems
to fit the situation in Topeka, Kansas, for instance, but it is far from the situation in Clarendon County, South Carolina. On the other hand, Clarendon
County now has a new school for the Negro students, and one can hardly avoid
asking whether anything less than the threat of desegregation would ever have
achieved such rapid good-faith compliance with Plessy v. Fergusonat this time
in that county. In view of the massive "school equalization" programs now
afoot in the Deep South (even assuming they are slightly overly rated, if they
are), one is hard put to understand how Mr. Greenberg can state, "In certain
places, however, law as legislation often has failed to change even conduct....
A hard core of states has hardly altered at all" (p. 7). This may not be the precise
result the author desired, but sometimes Mr. Greenberg seems to apply his
criteria so severely that he tends to ignore evidence which adds strong support
to his fundamental thesis.
With all this said, special sympathy should be extended the author for his
having even attempted to write this first chapter. As he says, it was to fill a gap.
But thus far no social scientist has produced more than pioneering theoretical
work on this subject. Some idea of the extremes appears to be relatively well
outlined, but the problem is one of multiple variables, and we simply do not
know precisely what those variables are or how they fit together in intermediate
situations. At any rate, he does succeed even here in providing considerable
evidence that law is a more effective agent of change than was believed by social
scientists in 1900.
Perhaps a final comment should be added about the fact that Mr. Greenberg
is Assistant Council to the NAACP Legal Defense Fund. It is obvious that his
form of presentation is most favorable to the long-range value commitment of
himself and that organization, as well as other American individuals and organizations, in favor of racial integration. He himself makes no bones about his
identity or his allegiance; he frequently discusses cases explicitly "from the
standpoint of our interests." This, however, does not make his book merely a
brief for the NAACP.
HARRY V. BALL*
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